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Possibilism is understood as the philosophical thesis that every proposition is
possible, trivialism is the stronger thesis that each proposition is even true. The
article does not argue for one of these two theses but rather aims to show by
the construction of suitable models that they cannot be dismissed for purely
logico-semantic reasons. Besides the introduction, the article comprises three
sections. The one following the introduction provides several explications of
possibilism and trivialism which differ with respect to their logical strength.
The next section explains a formal framework within which some models are
constructed which implement possibilist and trivialist ideas. The final section
discusses the formal framework from a philosophical point of view.
The basic type of structure used for the model construction (for a propo-
sitional logic L with connectives from the set C) is that of a 6-tuple SL =
〈F,V, D+, D−, {fc : c ∈ C}, v〉. F is the set of wffs of L, V the set of truth
values, fc is the truth-function corresponding to connective c, and v the inter-
pretation function which determines in accordance with the fc (c ∈ C) truth
values for the elements of F starting from some evaluation of the propositional
parameters. D+ ⊆ V is the set of designated, D− ⊆ V the set of antidesignated
truth values. There is a partial order ≤ defined on V and it is assumed that
V is closed under the formation of infima and suprema. Furthermore, there
is a minimal element ⊥ ∈ D− and a maximal element > ∈ D+. Finally, the
following two conditions are postulated to be fulfilled for x, y ∈ V: (1) x ∈ D+
and y 6∈ D+ implies x 6< y; and (2) x ∈ D− and y 6∈ D− implies y 6< x. It
should be noted that it is not required that the designated and antidesignated
truth values are proper subsets of V. It is even not postulated that they are
disjunct, and one could, for instance, also have > = ⊥.
Extensions of the logic L by the modalities  and ♦ are accommodated by
adding to the structures described above a set of indices W and an accessibility
relation R ⊆W ×W . A subset O ⊆W of ordinary worlds is distinguished. The
set W \O comprises the “peculiar” indices which function like the non-normal
worlds of modal logics. The interpretation function v : F −→ V is extended to
an equally named function v : F ×W −→ V which is dependent on indices as its
second arguments: (1) Let w ∈ O. (1.1) If the main connective of the wff A is
from c ∈ C, then vw(A) is calculated as before by means of the truth function
fc. (1.2) vw(A) is the infimum of {vw′ |wRw′}. (1.3) vw(♦A) is the supremum
of {vw′ |wRw′}. (2) If w ∈W \O, then the truth value vw may be calculated in
accordance to other rules which, however, may not be in conflict with the rules
of case (1). The idea behind this stipulation is that the clauses under (1) specify
the minimal semantic requirements for the meaning of the connectives c ∈ C and
the modalities. These minimal conditions have to be respected even in peculiar
indices w ∈ W \ O though they may be supplemented by further stipulations.
Construction of models reflecting trivialist and possibilist attitudes are carried
out then by making use of both the very liberal requirements for the sets V,
D+, and D− and the admittance of “peculiar” indices.
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